In this paper we use the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) to analyze the evolution of the wage premium of firm-and industry-level agreements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (the CE3) around the time of their accession to the EU. We find that despite a generalized reduction in union coverage in these countries, the union wage premium after accession to the EU became bigger and statistically more significant. This is particularly the case for Poland and Hungary, where in the years immediately following EU accession a wage premium associated with industry-level agreements emerged which mostly applied to low-income workers ages 30 and older.
Introduction
The extensive reforms of labor market institutions that occurred in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (the CE3) in preparation for accession to the European Union were widely expected to have a profound impact on the organizational strength and bargaining power of trade unions and employer organizations in these countries. From the early 1990s onward, the transition to a market economy had paved the way for a process of union "revitalization," which was signaled by the existence of union wage premia in newly established private enterprises (Magda et al., 2012) . Starting in the early 2000s, the prospect of accession to the EU triggered an extensive set of institutional reforms in the CE3. In its 1995 White
Paper, the European Commission stated explicitly that the implementation of these reforms was a prerequisite for entry into the EU (European Commission 1995) . The objective of these reforms was to improve the dialogue between the social partners, establishing a role for the government in a tripartite concertation mechanism, and enforcing labor standards comparable to those of the existing EU member
states (EIRO 1998 ) . In addition, the participation of CE3 policymakers in the EU's Open Method of Coordination in the area of labor market policy was also expected to help these countries reshape their national labor market institutions so that they more closely resembled the institutions of the EU15 member states. As these discussions and exchanges of good practice placed a strong emphasis on the involvement in policy-making of unions and employer organizations, it was anticipated that the influence and bargaining power of these social partners would be enhanced.
The effects of these extensive institutional reforms on the structure of wages in the former transition Anglo-Saxon and the western European models. It presents a form of national-level social dialogue comprised of worker and employer representative organizations, which deliberate on improvements in employment legislation and on the scope for national increases in pay. This system combines firm-level and industry-level pay agreements, a national minimum wage, and a labor inspectorate that oversees the enforcement of labor rights and employment contracts. Unlike in some western European countries, where individual firms may be subject to both industry-and firm-level agreements, (e.g., Italy, France, and Germany), in the CE3 model there is no overlap between these two types of agreement, and a large share of the workforce is employed in firms not covered by either type of agreement.
Among the former transition economies, the CE3 are of particular interest for at least two reasons. First, they are the earliest reformers among the post-socialist economies of central and eastern Europe, and they entered the 2000s with a collective bargaining system that was deemed sufficiently mature to implement the reforms required for EU accession. Second, they were the first post-socialist economies to join the European Union (in 2004) . Thus, we can assume that the experiences of the CE3 provide a valid benchmark for future EU accessions.
We With this study, we are contributing to the literature which has analyzed the effect of institutional changes on the union wage premium and wage inequality. Existing research has focused on changes in western (mostly Anglo-Saxon) economies. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) analyzed the impact of institutional decline on the rise in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s, and showed that these de-unionization and minimum wages cuts were responsible for about one-third of the increase in male and female wage inequality. Gosling and Machin (1994) and Machin and Manning (1994) analyzed the contribution of declining unionization to increasing wage inequality in Britain between 1980 and 1990.
They showed that the decline in the share of plants with a recognized union accounted for around 15% of the rise in earnings inequality during the period. Koeniger et al. (2007) used aggregate data to investigate how the change in labor market institutions affected wage inequality in 11 OECD countries between 1973 and 1998. They found a consistent reduction in male wage inequality in countries (e.g., France) where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but increased inequality in countries (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) where unions became less powerful and minimum wages fell. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to look at the effect on the structure of wages in post-socialist economies of institutional changes which have had an impact on the power of unions. In particular, our focus on the years 2002 and 2006 allows us to concentrate on the wage effects of institutional changes that occurred during the accession of these countries to the European Union.
EU accession and the institutional setting of CEE countries
An essential element of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is the development of labor market institutions that determine how firms and workers negotiate employment contracts and revise employment terms. In the three countries examined in this paper, the transition to a market economy occurred in two main stages: the immediate institutional changes that came about after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, followed by accession to full membership of the European Union in 2004.
The first stage of the post-1989 transition involved a large-scale shift to privately owned enterprises, and the initial establishment of new social partner organizations. In contrast, EU accession involved more far-reaching changes to labor market institutions, in part to bring them into line with the EU employment legislation, and in part to adapt them to the European single market.
Collective bargaining at the beginning of the 2000s
Following a sharp decline in the 1990s, union coverage in the CE3 countries was low in the early 2000s.
At that time, some firms were covered by firm-or industry-level agreements, but the majority were not covered at all. Bargaining mostly took place at a single level, and there was very little centralization or coordination (Table 1) . 4 Industry-level agreements played a very minor role in these countries (EIRO, 2002a,b) . To the extent they existed, these agreements generally took the form of multi-employer agreements signed by a number of individual employers and the relevant trade unions. These agreements lacked mandatory extension mechanisms. Thus, unless they were signed by employers with a dominant position in the market, the agreements covered only a small proportion of the sector.
Furthermore, the weak institutional setting, as well as the low degree of mutual recognition by the social partners themselves, impeded the enforcement of industry-level agreements (EIRO 2002a). These private-sector agreements were therefore very weak.
At the beginning of the 2000s, the effective enforcement of firm-level agreements was relatively low as well, and there was a great deal of heterogeneity across firms even within the same country. First, as employers were not required to enter into such agreements, enterprise-level negotiations were entirely voluntary, and reflected a power relationship that mostly favored employers. The collective agreements signed during this period were strongly influenced by the rapid expansion of multinational companies (MNCs) during the late 1990s. MNCs generally applied to their subsidiaries industrial relations practices similar to those applied to the parent company, but they adapted the practices to the local socioeconomic environment (Meardi 2007b; Meardi et al. 2009 ). The strategic use by these MNCs of innovative systems of variable pay linked to performance and skills tended to benefit more qualified and managerial workers (EIRO 2009a (EIRO , 2009b (EIRO , and 2009c Ost and Weinstein 1999; Aguilera and Dabu 2005; Hancké and Kurekova 2008) . However, while they had some broad common features, the systems of collective bargaining in the CE3 also differed in some important respects at the beginning of the 2000s.
Collective bargaining in the Czech Republic and Poland was more decentralized than it was in Hungary.
Union power in these countries was concentrated in newly established firms and reflected the rapid expansion of MNCs, as described above (see Magda et al. 2012 ). The Hungarian model of collective bargaining was much closer to the western European model, with the predominance of sector-level agreements, a higher degree of union coverage, and better coordination of collective bargaining.
Because Hungary embarked on the process of liberalization and restructuring earlier than the other two countries, its collective bargaining system underwent a more gradual evolution than the systems in the Czech Republic and Poland. For example, in Hungary embryonic systems of social concertation and rent-sharing were in place as early as in the 1980s (Zwass 1984; Neumann 1997 
Institutional changes after accession to the EU
By 2002, all three countries in our study had laid the foundations for a modern European system of labor market regulation. However, in order to create the conditions required for successful integration into the EU and to meet EU employment law standards, they still needed to consolidate this system.
The years immediately preceding EU accession represented a period of intense change. As we can see in Table 1 , trade union densities and coverage were decreasing, which reflected general trends observed in the majority of EU countries (European Commission, 2010) . However, unlike in the western EU countries, in the CE3 declining union density and coverage did not necessarily imply a weakening of the influence of pay bargaining institutions. Arguably, the strengthening of other parts of the institutional framework of pay determination in the CE3 through EU accession has enhanced pay bargaining power in these countries. Generally, the reinforced regulatory framework in the CE3 has enabled the employees who remained covered to demand wages closer to their objectives.
In the CE3 countries, the labor codes underwent major overhauls, new obligations under EU directives on social affairs were implemented, and the labor market administrations were reformed during this period. These changes built on the work of the previous decade, but also represented a significant shift in the environment of pay determination. Two areas of change were of particular importance: (i) direct actions aimed at strengthening the social partners' ability to bargain, and (ii) various reforms of the labor market institutions, which indirectly enhanced the power and the position of unions.
Among the direct actions taken in preparation for EU accession was a major effort to strengthen the organizational infrastructure of the social partners to enable them to engage in the European social dialogue and in the procedural regulation of labor markets. These actions represented a substantial reinforcement of the institutions for social dialogue and pay determination in the three countries, helping them move from being "transition economies" to being full economic and political participants in the EU. These processes continued after EU accession. For instance, shortly after accession, the CE3 As was mentioned above, the accession itself brought about further changes in the social partners' duties and levels of policy engagement, even if a strengthening of their role was not directly intended.
For instance, CE3 countries started to participate in the EU's "Open Method of Coordination" in the fields of labor and social policies. Although this involvement did not entail the passage of binding legislation, the process of participating in discussions, exchanging good practices, and preparing national employment plans required policy-makers in these countries to engage in extensive consultation with the social partners about the draft guidelines and their annual assessment by the European Commission.
Thus, this process indirectly increased trade unions' levels of policy engagement and policy-making know-how, and likely improved union bargaining power by reinforcing the procedural legitimacy of collective agreements (Garcia et al., 2004) . Furthermore, during the study period there were important changes in the laws and enforcement mechanisms related to the minimum wage, which is again likely to be reflected in the unions' bargaining power. In all three countries the minimum wage is set at the national level, but the social partners take part in the negotiations, which raises their policymaking profile. For instance, in Poland a new law on the minimum wage came into force in early 2003. This law shifted the power in the negotiations toward the social partners (under a tripartite framework) and away from the Minister of Labor, who was previously permitted to make a unilateral determination (EIRO 2002c) . The enhanced role of the social partners may be expected to lead to collective agreements which make minimum wage enforcement more effective, by, for example, ensuring that minimum wage regulations are observed for covered workers, and facilitating spillover effects (Manning, 2011) . Finally, in the period after the EU accession, the 2003 Working Time Directive was implemented at the national levels, again with the engagement of the social partners. The directive required the EU member states to guarantee workers a set of rights relating to, for example, the number of work hours, rest periods, and leave periods (Falkner and Treib, 2004) . Again, the enforcement of these measures is likely to be higher in firms covered by agreements, and to have a positive impact on workers' wages.
In sum, there has been a substantial reinforcement of the institutions for social dialogue and pay determination in the CE3 since these countries joined the EU. It is also likely that accession has had an impact on the wages negotiated under collective bargaining; an issue we investigate in the next section.
Empirical Analysis

Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from The European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) 2002 6 and 2006 waves, a matched employer-employee dataset which includes information on salaries, personnel, jobs, and firm characteristics in the manufacturing, construction, and trade and service sectors. For convenience and comparability across countries and over time, we excluded from the sample establishments which had fewer than 10 employees and were covered by any other type of bargaining agreement, such as agreements with individual professional groups that fall within a wide range of economic activities (Eurostat, 2003) . To reduce the "noise" created by the public sector and its non-market remuneration mechanisms, we have chosen to focus on private firms. We have also restricted our analysis to the manufacturing sector, as the economic transition in these countries led to the creation of a completely new service sector which was generally not covered by unions (Gardawski 2002) . In addition, we excluded women from the analysis to avoid having to deal with selection issues and unexplained gender wage gaps which might bias our results. After these observations were excluded, the sample for the of workers in the Czech Republic, and 67% of workers in Poland had a permanent contract. In all three countries, the workers who were covered by a collective agreement (either at the firm or the industry level) were more likely to have had a permanent contract than the workers who were not covered by an agreement. There were also big differences in the composition of the workforce by type of coverage. In 2002, the firms covered by collective agreements in the Czech Republic and Poland had bigger and older workforces, while there were no significant compositional differences between the firms covered by firm-level or industry-level agreements. In Hungary, the workers covered by collective agreements, particularly at the industry level, tended to be less educated than their counterparts in the Czech Republic and Poland. et al. (1996) increased the difference between the wages paid to workers covered by firm-level agreements and workers not covered by any agreement.
For Poland and Hungary, the re-weighting technique also increased the difference between the wages paid to workers covered by industry-level agreements and workers not covered by an agreement.
Finally, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2006 in the Czech Republic, wage growth was similar for covered and non-covered workers. Conversely, in Poland and Hungary wage growth for workers covered by firm-and industry-level agreements was markedly higher than it was for uncovered workers.
Empirical framework
We assume the following model of earnings for male worker i at establishment j:
( 1) where w ij is the log hourly wage, is a set of individual characteristics (age, age squared, education), represents the wage premium paid to worker i at workplace j, while ε ij is a stochastic error component. We further assume that the wage premium is explained by the following model:
Where FA j and IA j are two dummies that indicate that the lowest level where bargaining takes place is the firm or the industry, respectively. is a set of firm and job characteristics (type of contract, firm size, sector). is a vector of the average characteristics of the co-workers; i.e., the workers in the same workplace and occupational group as individual i. We assume that due to regularities in the recruitment behavior of firms within each broad occupational groups, the workers with higher unobserved skills tend to have co-workers with higher average skill levels. In this case, the average characteristics of the co-workers (i.e., the average age, the share who have a university degree, the share who are women, and the shares who are under age 30 and over age 55) control for the impact of the workers' unobserved skills on the wage premium (see, e.g., Card and de la Rica (2006)). Substitute e., the endowments), and a part that is attributable to the different returns to these predictors (i.e., the coefficients), plus a residual interaction term. We then compute the following quantities:
Equation (4) Finally, estimating equation (3) on average wages does not give us any information about the impact of collective agreements for different group of workers. The heterogeneous effects of collective agreements on wages may reflect differences in union policies or a decision to target specific worker categories. Moreover, any change in these effects between 2002 and 2006 is most likely related to a change in the distribution of workers' bargaining power during this period. To tackle these issues, we first use quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to uncover any differences in the effects of firm-and industry-level agreements along the conditional wage distribution, and then estimate equation (3) for workers belonging to different age groups. An obvious issue in the estimates reported in Table 4 is firms' unobserved heterogeneity. Less productive firms, which pay lower wages may self-select in the unionized sector, inducing a downward bias in the estimated impact of firm-and industry-level agreements on wages. Magda et al. (2012) showed that due to the restructuring of firms during the transition, a great deal of firms' unobserved heterogeneity in CE3 countries can be captured by the age of the firm: older companies established before the transition are generally less productive than newer firms founded after the transition. In Table 6 Table 6 further suggest that changes in the composition of workers characteristics (endowments) played minor and mostly insignificant roles. In particular, changes in the composition of workers in terms of their coverage by collective agreements did not significantly change the average wage, with the exception of Hungary, where the decline in the percentage of employees covered by firm-level agreements drove the average wage down (though again, its role was rather small).
Results
The results in Table 4 do not give us any information about the impact of collective agreements at different points of the wage distribution. In order to check whether the results described above hide different impact of unions at different points in the wage distribution, we now apply quantile regressions. We focus on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75 th , and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution. As in the OLS regressions, the sampling weights and the clustering of standard errors are accounted for. Table 7 reports the results from the regressions based on model 3, including the widest set of control dummies. In the Czech Republic, firm-level agreements had no positive impact in 2002, while a weakly Finally Table 8 reports results from estimates of equation (3) 
Discussion and Conclusions
In the CEE countries, the process of integration into the EU structures continued after the initial set of reforms and adjustments, and were strengthened in many areas after the EU accession. Our aim in this paper was to investigate whether these processes changed the role and the position of collective bargaining among the 2004 accession countries. Based on the evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, we found significant changes in the effects of collective agreements on workers' wages in a relatively short period of time; i.e., immediately before and after EU enlargement.
Our analyses shed light on an interesting phenomenon: although the presence of trade unions (measured by their density and collective bargaining coverage) continues to decline, the unions that still operate appear to have reinforced and increased their bargaining power, which is reflected in the appearance of or increase in wage premia associated with collective agreements. The rising wage premia observed primarily in Hungary and Poland (and mostly in the lower part of the wage distribution), and to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic, suggest that the unions which were strong enough to maintain their position and presence-most likely because of their efficiency, with a benefit for employers as well-managed to achieve their goals in terms of wage agreements. We link these changes to the developments in the CE3's labor market institutional reforms and developments.
There was no single policy reform which resulted in a sudden increase in the bargaining power of trade unions. Rather, we have identified a series of small steps which together led to a higher degree of engagement of the social partners in policy-making, and thus to an improvement of their negotiating position (as well as of their negotiating skills). These steps included direct actions aimed at reforming the social dialogue (such as the EU working councils directive), as well as various changes in the CE3's labor market policy which required active involvement on the part of trade unions.
Relative to Hungary and Poland, the lack of statistical significance for the effects of collective agreements in the Czech Republic may reflect a combination of less effective reforms (e.g., to minimum wages) and the greater use of mandatory extension of agreements, which attenuates the difference between covered and non-covered workers.
Although the firms' restructuring during the transition allowed us to control for a great deal of firms' unobserved heterogeneity in the CE3 countries, some of our results may be affected by residual selection issues. In particular, the selection of bad firms into the unionized sector may attenuate any positive effect of unions on wages; however, the existence of a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining at the bottom of the wage distribution seems to be a robust result since the selection of less productive firms into the unionized sector in this case would work in the opposite direction. Accordingly, our results are likely to underestimate the true effect of firm-level agreements on wages Finally, we note that the experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary may shed an interesting light on the future developments of the collective bargaining institutions in countries such as Albania, or the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. These countries have political histories similar to those of the CE3, and have just started (or are about to start) the process of reforming these institutions in preparation for gaining EU membership. [6] include interactions between firm age and firm size. All specifications include individual characteristics, firm sector, size and characteristics of coworkers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% All specifications also include dummies for firm sector and size (not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%
